

**ON PEACE:
PEACE AS A MEANS OF STATECRAFT**

Colonel James H. Herrera, USMC

June 2009

Visit our website for other free publication
downloads

<http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/>

[To rate this publication click here.](#)

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. As such, it is in the public domain, and under the provisions of Title 17, United States Code, Section 105, it may not be copyrighted.

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE JUN 2009		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2009 to 00-00-2009	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE On Peace: Peace as a Means of Statecraft				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 122 Forbes Avenue, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5244				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Same as Report (SAR)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 19	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244.

All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications are available on the SSI homepage for electronic dissemination. Hard copies of this report also may be ordered from our homepage. SSI's homepage address is: *www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil*.

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on our homepage at *www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/newsletter/*.

ISBN 1-58487-395-7

PREFACE

The U.S. Army War College provides an excellent environment for selected military officers and government civilians to reflect on and use their career experience to explore a wide range of strategic issues. To assure that the research conducted by Army War College students is available to Army and Department of Defense leaders, the Strategic Studies Institute publishes selected papers in its “Carlisle Papers” Series.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Antulio J. Echevarria II', with a large, stylized flourish at the end.

ANTULIO J. ECHEVARRIA II
Director of Research
Strategic Studies Institute

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

JAMES H. HERRERA, a U.S. Marine Corps colonel, is currently the Chief of Operations, J2 at Central Command. Prior to this assignment, he was on the faculty of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA. Colonel Herrera also served as a battalion commander, company commander, battalion and Marine Expeditionary Unit Intelligence officer. He is also a Latin American Foreign Area Officer and served as a Brigade Military Trainer and Instructor at the National Intelligence School in El Salvador. He has served in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, JOINT ENDEAVOR, GUARDIAN ASSISTANCE, ALLIED FORCE, ALLIED HARBOR, JOINT GUARDIAN, AVID RESPONSE, and IRAQI FREEDOM. Colonel Herrera holds a B.A. in Political Science from Ramapo College, NJ, a Master's of International Affairs from The Catholic University of America, Washington, DC, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College Class of 2009.

ABSTRACT

Peace is a phrase that is often used but vaguely understood. Conventional thought considers peace as a condition that shares a dialectical relationship with war, albeit devoid of a separate nature of its own. Upon closer examination, peace has a pragmatic quality and the potential to be a separate element of statecraft, not simply the absence, termination, or continuation of war. This paper examines peace at the individual, collective, and inter-collective levels. It does so by addressing three central questions: First, how is peace defined and what is its nature? Is it a natural condition or an artificially constructed one? Second, does it differ at the individual, collective, and inter-collective levels? And third, can peace stand on its own as a means of policy relative to diplomacy and war? In essence, can peace be waged? Research reveals that a complex paradigmatic change in statecraft must occur in order to employ peace as a “shaping” and sustaining action. Further inquiry is required to fully understand its potential as a tool, one similar to “soft power.” This paper contains recommendations for the continued development of this concept.

ON PEACE: PEACE AS A MEANS OF STATECRAFT

There can be peace without any kind of war, but no war that does not suppose some kind of peace.

St. Augustine, *The City of God*

Peace is a phrase that is often used but vaguely understood, it means many things to many people. On the surface, it appears banal yet upon deeper examination, it holds a complexity often overlooked by scholars and decisionmakers alike. Conventional thought characterizes peace as a condition that exists *ante bellum* and *post bellum*, sharing a dialectical relationship with war, albeit devoid of a separate nature of its own. While peace has a plurality of characters, it has a pragmatic quality and the potential to be a separate element of statecraft and not simply the absence, termination, or continuation of war. War, diplomacy, and peace are not antithetical to one another insofar as they should serve the same political ends.

Statecraft is the art of conducting state affairs by synchronizing ends, ways, and means to advance national interests. Concomitantly, diplomacy and war are the means to the ends of statecraft. Diplomacy is the art of “nonphysical” shaping or gaining an advantageous position, while war or military force is the physical action. Both diplomacy and war have been described and analyzed since antiquity; their nature, character, and significance examined. But what about another component, that of Peace? A common idea is that “war is about peace” or, more specifically, the striving for “a better peace,” one that may deter or provide a strategic advantage in a future engagement. Another belief is that peace is a temporary reprieve within a conflict that has yet to be terminated. These assertions support the principle of a “war-peace continuum.” In this paradigm, war and peace maintain a cyclical relationship in which neither element is truly independent of the other, with the latter consistently playing the role of national goal, ends, or objective. But can peace exist outside this model? In essence, can peace offer a distinct option or approach as a means of statecraft?

The purpose of this paper is to examine peace and its relation to national policy, not to present a treatise on the abolition of war, conflict prevention, or conflict resolution. Peace will be analyzed at the individual, collective (societal-state), and inter-collective (international) levels, with the intent of removing it from the realm of pure philosophy and into the arena of utility in its application for policy. This paper addresses three central questions: First, how is peace defined and what is its nature? Is it a natural condition or an artificially constructed one? Second, does it differ at the individual, collective, and inter-collective levels? And third, can peace stand on its own as a means of policy relative to diplomacy and war? In essence can peace be waged? Research reveals that a complex paradigmatic change in statecraft must occur to employ peace as a “shaping” and sustaining action. Further inquiry is required to fully understand its potential as a tool, one similar to “soft power.”¹ At the conclusion of the paper, recommendations are offered for the continued development of this concept.

PEACE DEFINED

War, nonwar, and peace are conditions that exist in world politics, according to the *Dictionary of International Relations*. The first indicates a condition of hostilities, the second a condition of competition without actual belligerency, and the third either a cessation or an absence of hostilities.² This framework relegates peace to a subordinate position of war and at the same time offers an incomplete assessment of its potentiality. Colin Gray proposes that “it is no small task to persuade westerners to think of peace and war as different phases of statecraft—distinctive, but essentially united and permanently connected.”³ Instead, we defer to a traditional linear model of thinking in which peace and war are events that occur exclusively of each other. To comprehensively address this issue, we must start at the beginning and pursue the definition or multiple definitions of peace. Wolfgang Dietrich and Wolfgang Sutzl assert that “post modernity calls for many peaces.” For them, peace is not a static idealistic end state but a tangible and attainable part of everyday life. They caution that peace cannot be exclusive (existing according to one cultural interpretation) or assimilative, because that would lead to resistance and upheaval. Essentially “the peaces do not become mutually compatible the moment everybody understands one another, but when all live in their own peace, that is, treat others like members of their own kin.”⁴

Peace is defined in many ways—as an individual state of inner harmony, a state of nonwar, a condition that exists after the termination of war, and even a condition that may cause war itself. Metaphysically, peace is an ideal state, an absence of hostility or violence, in essence, “the most longed for human condition.” It is a condition that remains formless and prone to misunderstanding. An analysis of peace at the individual level presents an inward focus, a sense of oneself “being at peace.” Contentment, the freedom from “want” (physical, emotional, or spiritual), is the highest form of peace attained through disciplined spirituality. This realization, in conjunction with acts of compassion and selflessness, are the essence of every major religion. Two fundamental questions that affect man and society are whether peace is inherent (in man) or a gift from a supreme being, and whether it can exist on earth or solely in the realm of heaven. The next section will review key concepts of peace according to Western and Eastern religious traditions.

Western Christian Conceptions.

The Bible states (Luke 2:14), “Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace to men on whom his favor rests,” and “Grace and peace to you from God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ” (Philippians 1:2). According to these statements, peace seems to come from God, the former being exclusive (those in His favor) while the latter divine (a greater type of peace). Scripture does not address war and peace distinctly; instead it reveals these concepts through God’s interaction with man. The Old Testament understood within the context of Israel’s relation to God presents a militant God; as such peace was seen as a gift (communal, not individual unity and tranquility) for maintaining fidelity to the covenant. In essence, peace was directly linked to justice and enduring salvation. Conversely, in the New Testament, two concepts stand out; the lack of a militant God, and the maturation of the notion of peace as His gift. Here we find man’s relation to God through his son Jesus Christ, and peace already realized by His sacrifice and reconciliation. Along with this peace comes responsibility “because we have been gifted with God’s peace in the

risen Christ, we are called to our own peace and to the making of peace in our world.”⁵ In this sense, peace is not a passive condition but one that can be developed and extended. Additionally, both Old and New Testaments propose an eschatological peace (final peace on earth) as a realistic end state. To further understand the concept of peace, we will examine the works of one of the most influential Christian writers.

St. Augustine believed that two types of peace exist, one in the City of Men (earth) and one in the City of God (heaven). In the former, man lives in a constant state of struggle, and thus peace represents only a momentary respite. In the latter, peace (“the only real peace”) reflects the “calm that comes of order,” specifically, a holistic equilibrium of body, soul, and community (domestic and political peace) in God. Unfortunately, man’s irrationality and insatiable appetites interfere with the attainment of communal fellowship and “ordered obedience.”⁶ According to Augustine, “where victory is not followed by resistance, there is a peace that was impossible so long as rivals were competing, hungrily, and unhappily for something material too little to suffice for both. This kind of peace is a product of the work of war, and its price is a so-called glorious victory.”⁷ In this statement we see the introduction of the concept of peace as the victor’s will. This concept will reemerge in the political contexts of the right peace (sustaining conflict termination) or the wrong peace (initiating follow-on conflict). Nevertheless, Christian doctrine asserts that the attainment of peace (on earth) should be constantly strived for.

Contemporary Catholic teaching views peace as an active positive element associated with order. According to Pope John Paul II, “Peace is not just the absence of war. It involves mutual respect and confidence between peoples and nations. It involves collaboration and binding agreements . . . that must be constructed patiently and with unshakeable faith.”⁸ In the “Pastoral Letter on War and Peace,” the Catholic Bishops described peace along three lines: first, as a plurality extending from an individual sense of well being to a cessation of armed hostility; second, as a “right” relationship with God (based on forgiveness, reconciliation, and union); and finally, as an eschatological peace where all things will be made whole due to the realization of God’s salvation.⁹ Similarly, author Rick Warren presents three kinds of peace: peace with God, the peace of God, and peace with others. He questions whether “peace on earth is possible, or whether it is an unattainable fantasy.” Warren opines that it is possible but only through a “building process” where it starts with “peace in one’s own heart, then peace within our families, our communities, and finally within and among nations.”¹⁰ This is consistent with the belief of other Christian notables. In an essay he wrote in 1968, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., asserted that peace is “not merely a distant goal that we seek, but a means by which we arrive at that goal.” For him, peace embodied the characteristics of equality, justice, and respect, and thus “peaceful ends had to be pursued through peaceful means.”¹¹ Western traditions view peace as man’s harmonious interrelationship anchored in faith. Similarly, it can be argued that Eastern traditions share a common understanding of peace as tranquility through faith.

Eastern Islamic and Buddhist Conceptions.

In the Islamic tradition, peace does not mean the absence of war but the absence of oppression and tyranny. Islam proposes that real peace can be attained only when justice

prevails.¹² Here again we see the notion of a just peace, one closely linked to equality and virtue. Moreover, the principle of peace goes beyond the absence of physical violence. In essence, peace (active peace) is directly related to human development and the proliferation of peace or “peacemaking.”¹³ Communal peace is dependent upon those who “do good” and the application of the tenets of the Quran.

In the Buddhist tradition, inner peace is the genesis of communal peace in which all sentient beings are interconnected, and any action (or lack thereof) has an effect on the whole. According to Pema Chodron, “War and Peace start in the heart of individuals.” The objective is to “soften your heart first, then expand it outwards.”¹⁴ Likewise the 14th Dalai Lama emphasized the centrality of inner peace to the world when he stated that “through inner peace, genuine world peace can be achieved.”¹⁵ In this, the importance of individual responsibility is quite clear; an atmosphere of peace must first be created within ourselves, then gradually expanded to include our families, our communities, and ultimately the whole planet. Unfortunately this “expansion” is challenged by the concepts of power and control. According to Philip Dunn, “peace in this century is still made out of the control achieved through successful war, the threat of war, or a strategy to prevent it.”¹⁶ For him, this form of peace is artificial, unbalanced, and lacks the grounding of inner contemplation. Without a change in focus, the only possible outcome is continued conflict.

What does peace look like when examined through the lens of western political theorists? Is peace diluted or perverted by *power and control*? In the following section the opinions of various influential thinkers regarding the relationship between peace, man, and the state will be examined. Philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke, and Hegel share a common understanding of the natural state of man and his limited prospect for eternal peace. Others are more optimistic and believe that man’s potential for communal good offers a realistic opportunity for international harmony. Overall, there seems to be consensus that peace is a goal that shares a close relationship with power and conflict.

PEACE AND POLITICS

Man has an innate proclivity to violence and selfishness as well as to compassion and selflessness; this is a perpetual internal conflict. Additionally, man’s search for individual contentment may at times clash with others, even in a state of communion (society), and thus peace or, more correctly, stability (order) must be imposed on him by a state. That said, an alignment of individual and communal peace must be sought. This entails introspection, planning, and action. General Anthony Zinni (USMC, Ret.) stated that “true peace is not passive, not a state of passivity. It is not a state of tranquility or of calm. It is not an absence of disturbance. It is not an absence of any kind. It’s a presence, an action.”¹⁷ For him, peace is not the natural state of society but a human construct that requires effort and implementation.

Thomas Hobbes believed that the natural condition of man was one of continuous competition and potential for violence. For him, peace was a temporary respite from hostility or more specifically “breathing time.” Hobbes’s fundamental law of nature proposed that every man ought to seek peace but, if unable to do so, then to seek the advantages of war. In essence, man’s motivation for peace was “fear of death” and not altruism. Ultimately, peace and security were attained not by common consensus (good

of all) or inner enlightenment, but by an externally imposed order made available when individual rights (and power) were transferred to the state.¹⁸

John Locke also believed that man was accountable only to himself in a pre-political state of nature (law held by the individual), but he departed from the Hobbesian belief that a state of nature and a state of war were synonymous. For Locke, war was not a state in itself but an “incident” that occurred when men failed to settle a dispute rationally.¹⁹ Peace in the state of nature existed not in the form of capitulation or redress but in a more constructive peace, and the political order it depended on were artificial constructs of political society. Locke believed that “civil society is a state of peace amongst those who are of it, from whom the state of war is excluded by the umpirage which they have provided in their legislative for the ending of all differences that may arise of them.”²⁰ Peace then is not a means on its own but a socio-political harmony attained by consensus, law, and government.

Immanuel Kant proposed that “the state of peace among men who live alongside each other is no state of nature (*status naturalis*).”²¹ Man exists in a state of potential war, and only law imposed by a state can offer peace. For Kant, peace is an end of hostilities, not a temporary suspension or preparation for future war. “Eternal-perpetual peace,” Kant believed, could exist among men and states so long as certain rules and principles (self determination, civil constitution, and international law) were followed. Kant held that a republican constitution (based on freedom, dependence, and equality) “offered the prospect of the desired purpose, that is to say eternal peace” because the consent of the citizenry is required to go to war. Thus reason enables the state of peace, while a social (international) contract based on interdependence sustains it.²²

In contrast to Kant, Hegel believed that “perpetual peace” is a chimera because relations between sovereign states cannot be brought under a single power or enforceable law and thus conflict, which is natural, will continue to exist throughout history. He went further and asserted that “just as the movement of the ocean prevents the corruption which would be the result of perpetual calm, so by war people escape the corruption which would be occasioned by a continuous or eternal peace.”²³ Peace is viewed as a static condition that interferes with a process of improving a state’s internal efficiency.

Another interesting perspective on the nature of peace and its relation to war comes from Edward Luttwak. He posited that just as war can be the origin of peace (through victory or culmination) “peace can be the origin of war in different ways, even though peace is only a negative abstraction . . . the condition of peace, that is the absence of war, can create the precondition for war.”²⁴ This event occurs when adversaries identify vulnerabilities in the disposition of the peaceful, often leading to renewed hostilities. According to Luttwak, historically peace led to war because certain conditions disturbed the preexisting balance of power that originally maintained peace. In the end, peace, although lacking any “substance of its own,” induces war because war is unable to “perpetuate itself.” War can only consume itself. Conversely then can peace induce itself or does a gap exist between “real and ideal” peace?

Nathan Funk believes that when idealistic peace becomes separated from reality, peace merely becomes “a pious invocation, a means to an end, or an empty term of rhetorical self-justification.” In an attempt to address the disassociation of peace, he proposed an exploration of “five Peace paradigms (approaches): peace through power politics, peace through world order, peace through conflict resolution, peace through nonviolence, and

peace through personal and community transformation.”²⁵ The first paradigm, regarding political realism and its theorists, was addressed in the beginning of this section. The second approach highlights the potential for peace through the “power of law,” where shared objectives, cooperation, and institutions are the foundations of the international community. The third approach focuses on communication and resolution; for Funk, peace is “a continuous process of skillfully dealing with and, whenever possible, preventing or transforming conflict.” The fourth approach relates power to human will and peace to justice. Funk asserts that “nonviolence offers an approach to peacemaking that has been used not only to counteract forms of social discrimination and political repression but also to resist foreign imperialism and occupation.” Finally, the fifth approach rests upon spirituality and interconnectedness. Here he highlights the criticality of developing and maturing an “internal process” (transformation) that should produce “peaceful behavior” or a “culture of peace.”²⁶ Funk’s construct is an important contribution to the examination of peace and its “multiple paths.” What remains unclear is the relation between his paradigms. Does a level of interdependence exist? Would a lasting peace require the combination (alignment) of individual, nonviolent, and institutional peace?

Any serious examination of peace, war, and diplomacy would be lacking without discussing the work of Raymond Aron. In his book *Peace and War*, he asserted that peace is “rationally the goal to which societies tend,” it is based on power, and usually found where conflict is absent. He further stated that “the principle of peace is not different in nature from that of wars, that is, on the relation between the capacities of acting upon each other possessed by the political units.”²⁷ For Aron, three types of peace existed at the conceptual level: “peace by power, peace by satisfaction (by confidence), and peace by terror (by impotence).” He further dissected the first category into three forms based on the “relation of forces”: equilibrium, hegemony, and empire. The first is apparent when political units are in balance, the second when the many are dominated by one, and the third when the many are “outclassed” by one. For Aron, peace did not come from an “approximate equality of forces,” but from the overwhelming superiority of one of them and thus, he turned his focus to Imperial peace.²⁸ Imperial peace is described as having both internal (civil peace) and external (peace among nations) components. The former is similar to the internal order of an empire based on the “pacification” of people associating themselves with the conquering state.²⁹ His elucidation of peace is an example of what can be defined as passive or “negative” peace. In contrast, active or “positive” peace “refers to a social condition in which exploitation is minimized or eliminated, and in which there is neither overt violence nor the more subtle phenomenon of underlying structural violence (repression, alienation).”³⁰ Aron’s exposition reinforced the portrayal of the human condition (uncertainty in power relations) offered by theorists in the beginning of this section.

Robert Gilpin has argued that imperial peace ensured order in the international system because it limited the ambitions of states to challenge the “stabilizer.” Others have argued that maintaining a balance of power actually caused greater instability due to the potential for persistent competition. Two other points to consider are whether the inequality of power is a source of peace and stability, and whether a particular form of government (autocratic or democratic) affects its likelihood for peace.

Democratic Peace.

Democratic peace theory asserts that democracies are generally more peaceful than nondemocracies and that they will never go to war with one another.³¹ In his essay “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” Michael Doyle asserts that governments with liberal principles “enjoy a separate peace among themselves.” His premise is that liberal principles and rights (freedom of the individual, freedom from arbitrary authority, right to promote opportunity for freedom, and representation) are the foundations of democratic peace or what he calls the “most successful zone of international peace established yet.”³² This theory is contested on the grounds that liberal governments are not necessarily more peaceful, especially with regards to relations with nonliberal governments. Is liberal peace the only approach to order and contentment? Can only democracies attain civil and interstate stability? Another interesting debate is whether peace is the result of democracy or its cause.

Michael Lind argues that contrary to conventional political thought, “peace makes republican liberalism possible.”³³ He believes that theorists often invert the causal relationship between peace and democratic activities. For him, “economic interdependence, international cooperation, liberalism, and democracy are not the causes of international peace; they are its results.”³⁴ In essence, peace enables the flourishing of democratic ideals, values, and processes. But what about peace and instability with regards to the volatile periods of democratization? Instability and periods of enhanced vulnerability are natural as states develop and institutions and processes mature. In their book *Real World Order*, Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky explain that “zones of peace” exist where conflict is confined to the peripheries of the international system and that “zones of turmoil” exist where burgeoning democracies are in the process of their normal developmental stage. What then is the relation between scope (quantity) and peace? Does a greater number of democracies equate to fewer conflicts due to wider zone(s) of peace? Peace in this regard may be obtained when an alignment exists between three levels of peace (individual, collective, and inter-collective). The next section will address Horowitz’s model of peace along with my conceptualization presented in terms of concentric rings and potential combinations of peace.

LEVELS OF PEACE AND STATECRAFT

To better understand “the meaning of peace,” Irving Horowitz establishes a three tiered construct based on individual, social, and the international levels. For Horowitz, it is possible at the individual level to attain inner peace without necessarily having a “community of peace-loving men.” Likewise, at the social level, harmony could be attained without necessarily “implying the inner calm of an individual.” At the international level, peace between nations does not “imply the existence of peace within each nation.”³⁵ This construct implies a negative interconnectedness between levels; however, Horowitz asserts that the individual “compresses these levels of existence within his being, and that it is this orderly integration . . . that enables him to attain a more meaningful peace.” In essence, world peace makes social and ultimately individual peace more fulfilled. Additionally, Horowitz asserts that “peace functions not only as an end, but as an instrument to other proximate ambitions as well since men will not surrender their quest

for economic security or political liberty for the sake of keeping the peace.”³⁶ Thus the quest for peace is not just sentimental but pragmatic as it can enable the continuation of “human progress.”

In a construct similar to Horowitz’s, peace is depicted according to Individual, Collective, and Inter-collective levels (see Figure 1). According to this model, the attainment of absolute peace (final) requires the realization of peace at each level. This level of alignment can exist in the abstract, but it is hard to find in reality. In contrast, the attainment of limited peace (realistic) requires the realization of two levels; the collective and the inter-collective. The consistency between domestic tranquility and foreign stability (with regards to international relations) offers the state the best chance for success. Additionally, two essential points merit explanation: first the concept of durability and sustainability of peace once achieved and second, the concept of inclusiveness and exclusiveness with regards to the realization of peace. Whose peace—mine or yours? Both have significant implications for foreign policy with regards to perceptions and permanence.




Figure 1. Levels of Peace.

The concentric rings and their associated characteristics (harmony, self-determination, and stability) offer a starting point for a closer examination of the potential combinations of peace that could exist in the international system (see Figure 2). Combinations of peace exist with regards to inner, domestic, and foreign conditions, and each set may have a distinct outcome or effect on political relations as they are perceived as being either “joint” (holistic) or “disjointed” (fragmented). Two questions to ponder: whether a repressive society can be considered to be at peace even if it is not at war, and conversely, whether a society “at peace” (externally) while undergoing domestic upheaval can also be at peace. Let us examine the Combinations of peace more closely.

“Combinations of Peace”			
1		2	
Individual - Inner	(Yes)	Individual - Inner	(No)
Collective - Domestic	(Yes)	Collective - Domestic	(Yes)
Inter-collective – Foreign	(Yes)	Inter-collective – Foreign	(Yes)
Joint		Disjointed	
3		4	
Individual - Inner	(No)	Individual - Inner	(No)
Collective - Domestic	(No)	Collective - Domestic	(No)
Inter-collective – Foreign	(Yes)	Inter-collective – Foreign	(No)
Disjointed		Disjointed	

Figure 2. Combinations of Peace.

Combination 1 embodies the characteristics of an absolute peace at all three levels. Individuals may share a sense of hope and altruism, and the group may enjoy tranquility that ultimately contributes to (enables) the state’s ability to engage other states with optimism and transparency. A contemporary example might be the recent euphoria experienced in the United States as a result of the election of President Obama. But how long can this period last? Combination 2 represents a more common trend in which individuals may not necessarily be content at the “inner level,” but collectively they are satisfied economically and/or socially. Similarly, the state may also be “in order,” which contributes to regional or global stability. An example of this model is Western Europe. Currently Europe is experiencing one of its most peaceful and prosperous moments in its history. The creation of the European Union is largely responsible for such a phenomenon. Regional order is aligned with both specific state and interstate stability. The exception, it can be argued, is the paucity of individual “inner” harmony caused by societal tensions (racism) and globalization (migration, secularism). Combination 3 may represent a deceptive peace or a condition that Angelo Codevilla describes as where “the victims of peace outnumber the victims of war.”³⁷ In this case, the state is responsible for subjugating and attacking its own citizens without necessarily being in conflict at the inter-collective level. For Codevilla, examples of such “historic horrors of peace” include the genocides in Cambodia and Rwanda. Combination 4 represents a model of absolute disharmony at all levels, one that would hinder pragmatic and constructive international relations. Peace according to this construct would more than likely be fragmented and short lived.

In 2002 Congressman Ron Paul delivered a speech in the House entitled “A Foreign Policy for Peace, Prosperity, and Liberty” when asked “What would a foreign policy for peace look like?” He proposed a “noninterventionist” foreign policy based on nonviolence, self-determination, and self-defense. He recommended the withdrawal of

U.S. forces from abroad (“antiquated form of security”), the discontinuation of foreign aid (“money rarely reaches the poor”), and U.S. withdrawal from international organizations (“negative entanglements”). His arguments are based on the notion that our “militaristic policies” were unsustainable, misguided, and antagonistic. In an interdependent world, would such isolationist proposals benefit us or our allies? I partially agree with his slogan “peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none,” but what is needed is a holistic, more assertive form of statecraft (based on peace and diplomacy), not a meeker, introverted one. More recently, Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, described the future security environment as one of perpetual conflict where it is “unlikely to unfold as a steady-state peace punctuated by distinct surges of intense conflict.” Instead, he considers the inverse (potential periods of peace) to be the norm.³⁸ Once again we find the term being used with little explanation. What is “steady-state peace?”

To be relevant, peace (as a means of statecraft) has to be a rational (pragmatic) act, one not “bound exclusively by passions” and specifically disassociated with the concepts (perceptions) of a “separate peace” or a peace imposed by coercion. Its composition would be an active peace in a nonmilitary (peace making) sense that would shape the political environment offering an alternative (not abolition) to war. In this regard, peace would be more “sustainable” than war in terms of actual expenditures (personnel, materiel, political support, etc.). As previously stated, the implementation of peace as “a means” requires a significant paradigm shift, one that would have to expand upon the concept of “soft power” by including adjustment, attraction (of one’s values), and inclusiveness (diversity). Chas Freeman warned that “a foreign policy based mainly on the impulse to propagate principles and ideas is, in fact, more disruptive of international order and more likely to generate armed conflict than one based on realistic accommodation of the interests of antagonists.”³⁹ This is not to say that a state cannot leverage cooperation (influence) through peace, it can by promoting proper values (human rights, respect, prosperity) in concert with proper action.

CONCLUSION

So how can a state “wage peace?” It can be executed by combining the alignment of a state’s levels of peace (internally) with proactive just engagement. In essence, creating influence through enticement (similar to “democracy by example, not coercion”). At its core, this concept follows Joseph Nye’s theory of “soft power” where “a country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries want to follow it, admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness.”⁴⁰ In this regard, peace is complementary to “smart power” (combination of soft and hard power) as a means to shape the behavior of others without having to resort to war.⁴¹ For this approach to be effective, we must keep in mind that peace, or “rest from satisfaction” as Professor Codevilla calls it, is interpreted and accepted differently by individuals and cultures according to their own terms.⁴² Peace must reflect collaboration and inducement and not imposition or submission. A false peace is difficult to conceal and more often difficult to correct without conflict.

The concept of Peace as a means of statecraft, unbound by the traditional notions of absence, termination, or continuation with regards to war, is not easy to conceptualize

and harder still to gauge. However, an analysis of this phenomenon may offer an unconventional approach to advancing national interests. The peace construct depicted in Figures 1 and 2 may serve as a tool to further such efforts. Harmony, tranquility, and order may be achieved by the reassertion of common values and civic virtues through education at the individual level, through stricter oversight and transparency for responsible governance at the collective level, and through the recuperation of international legitimacy and trust at the inter-collective level. When two or three of these levels are satisfied, peace as a tool can begin to be realized. That said, there are certain challenges associated with this concept, ranging from situational appreciation (how early can peace be implemented?) to integration (which levels of peace are higher in priority?) to assessment (can durability or permanence be measured and predicted?). Additionally, quantitative and qualitative indicators of peace (related to socioeconomic satisfaction) need to be developed. Whether peace can become a means of statecraft equivalent to diplomacy and war remains to be seen; however, I believe this subject merits continued examination.

ENDNOTES

1. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *The Paradox of American Power*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 9.
2. Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newham, *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*, London, United Kingdom (UK): The Penguin Group, 1998, p. 423.
3. Colin S. Gray, *Fighting Talk*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2007, p. 9.
4. Wolfgang Dietrich and Wolfgang Sutzl, *A Call For Many Peaces*, Innsbruck, Austria: Peace Center Burg Schlaining, 1997, p. 16.
5. United States Catholic Conference, *The Challenge Of Peace, God's Promise and Our Response*, Washington DC, 1983, p. 24.
6. St. Augustine, *City Of God*, Gerald G. Walsh *et al.*, trans., New York: Bantam Doubleday, 1958, p. 456.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 328.
8. United States Catholic Conference, p. 13.
9. *Ibid.*
10. Rick Warren, *The Purpose Of Christmas*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008, p. 88.
11. Martin Luther King Jr., *The World House Essay*, December 11, 1964; available from www.theworldhouse.org/whessay.html, accessed December 5, 2008.
12. Louay M. Safi, *Peace and the Limits of War*, London, UK: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2003, p. 31.

13. Farid Mirbagheri, *Islam and Liberal Peace*, paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, CA, March 22, 2006, p. 2.
14. Pema Chodron, *Practicing Peace in Times of War*, Boston, MA: Shambala, 2006, p. 15.
15. Kenneth Kraft, *Inner Peace, World Peace: Essays on Buddhism and Non-Violence*, New York: State University Press, 1992, p. 3.
16. Philip Dunn, *The Art Of Peace*, New York: Penguin Group, 2003, p. 13.
17. Tony Zinni and Tony Koltz, *The Battle For Peace*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006, p. 210.
18. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, C. B. Macpherson, ed., London, UK: Penguin Group, 1985, p. 186.
19. Peter Laslett, ed., *John Locke Two Treatises of Government*, London, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 113.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 212.
21. Allen W. Wood, ed., *Basic Writings of Kant*, New York: Modern Library, 2001, p. 441.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 442.
23. G. W. F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, S. W. Dyde, trans., Kitchener, Ontario, Canada: Batoche Books, 2001, p. 259.
24. Edward N. Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace*, London, UK: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001, p. 67.
25. Nathan C. Funk, *Peace Non-Violence and Conflict Resolution*, October 2002, available from www.mkgandhi.org/nonviolence/index.htm, accessed January 13, 2009.
26. *Ibid.*
27. Raymond Aron, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations*, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1966, p. 151.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 152.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 153.
30. David P. Barash and Charles P. Webel, *Peace and Conflict Studies*, London, UK: Sage Publications, 2002, p. 6.
31. Michael Lind, *The American Way of Strategy*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 36.
32. Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., *Debating the Democratic Peace*, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997, p. 49.

33. Lind, p. 37.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 36.
35. Irving Louis Horowitz, *The Idea of War and Peace: The Experience of Western Civilization*, London, UK: Transaction Publishers, 2007, p. 34.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 47.
37. Angelo Codevilla and Paul Seabury, *War: Ends, Ways, and Means*, Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006, p. 8.
38. *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*, Version 3.0, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 15, 2009, p. 4.
39. Chas W. Freeman, Jr., *Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy*, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007, p. 13.
40. Nye, p. 8.
41. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Commission on Smart Power, *A Smarter, More Secure America*, Washington, DC: The CSIS Press, 2007, p. 7.
42. Codevilla and Seabury, p. 28.